What the Duty of Loyalty Requires
Subsection (1) is the standard, and Florida's Fourth District has quoted it in exactly these terms.
Section 736.0802(1), Florida Statutes (2019), provides that "[a]s between a trustee and the beneficiaries, a trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries."
Bronstein v. Estate of Bronstein, No. 4D20-2661 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec. 22, 2021).
Solely is the word to sit with. This is not a duty to be reasonable, or to weigh your interests fairly against the trustee's own. The nine subsections that follow are largely a map of exceptions and procedures, and working out which one your facts fall into usually decides the argument before it starts.
The Fee Agreement That Survived Bankruptcy
In 2014 a federal district court in Florida, hearing a bankruptcy appeal, applied the duty to a co-trustee who had signed a beneficiary up to a fee agreement. He had not invented anything or forged anything. He had simply not told her the fee was optional.
Here, West was Co-Trustee before he entered into the Fee Agreement with Aleta. Accordingly, as the Bankruptcy Court held, he had the duty to do more than simply not to act unreasonably. He had the duty to "administer the trust in good faith, in accordance with ... the interests of the beneficiaries," and to "administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries." Fla. Stat. §§ 736.0801 and 736.0802 (emphases added).
West v. Chrisman, 518 B.R. 655 (M.D. Fla. 2014).
The court added the disclosure obligation that comes with the role.
And he had "[the] obligation to make full disclosure to the beneficiary of all material facts." First Union Nat'l Bank v. Turney, 824 So.2d 172, 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
West v. Chrisman, 518 B.R. 655 (M.D. Fla. 2014).
And then it applied the duty to what he had done.
By entering into the Fee Agreement without affirmatively advising Aleta that such a fee was not mandatory or explaining any alternatives to her, West acted in reckless disregard of these duties.
At the very least, West acted in reckless disregard of his duties of loyalty and candor, and grossly and egregiously deviated from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding fiduciary would observe.
West v. Chrisman, 518 B.R. 655 (M.D. Fla. 2014).
The consequence was that the resulting debt of $212,478 was held non-dischargeable in his bankruptcy, as a defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity. A trustee who breaches this duty badly enough cannot necessarily walk away from the judgment.
One qualification we should be straight about. This is a federal court applying Florida law, so it is persuasive rather than binding on a Florida state court. It is also the clearest application of subsection (1) that we located, which tells you something about how thin the Florida appellate law on the core duty is.
Self Dealing, and Why Voidable Beats Void
Subsection (2) deals with the trustee on both sides of a deal. A sale, encumbrance or other transaction involving the investment or management of trust property, entered into by the trustee for the trustee's own personal account or otherwise affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests, is voidable by an affected beneficiary.
Voidable, not void, and the difference is practical. A void transaction never had effect. A voidable one stands until somebody with the right undoes it, which means the right can be lost. It is subject to the protection the Code gives people who deal with a trustee in good faith, it can be cut off by an effective consent, release or ratification, and it can time out. Our page on the limitations period covers the last of those.
Subsection (3) is softer. Where the transaction is with someone closely connected to the trustee rather than the trustee personally, a conflict is presumed rather than assumed, and the presumption can be rebutted on fairness and arm's length terms. Subsection (7) then carves out transactions the section does not preclude at all if they are fair to the beneficiaries, and reasonable compensation to the trustee is one of them.
When the Trustee Pays Its Own Lawyer From the Trust
Here is where the developed Florida case law under this section actually is, and it is the situation most beneficiaries meet first. You sue the trustee, or accuse it of something, and it hires counsel and pays them from the trust, which is your money.
Subsection (10) governs. The Fourth District set out the shape of it in 2015, applying the 2011 version.
Section 736.0802(10) provides for the payment of attorneys' fees incurred in any proceeding involving the trust from the assets of the trust "without the approval of any person and without court authorization."
The exception is when the action involves a breach of trust, as in the instant case. § 736.0802(10), Fla. Stat.
Where breach of trust is alleged against the trustee, "the trustee shall provide written notice to each qualified beneficiary of the trust whose share of the trust may be affected by the payment of attorney's fees." § 736.0802(10)(a).
Once this notice is provided, the burden is on a party to the action to obtain a court order to prohibit the trustee from paying for fees from trust assets. § 736.0802(10)(b).
Snider v. Metcalfe, 157 So. 3d 422 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).
Read that last sentence twice if you are the beneficiary. Once notice is given, the burden shifts to you. Nothing happens automatically.
That same decision answers a question trustees ask. Filing the notice is not a submission to the court's jurisdiction, because the notice is filed pursuant to a statutory requirement and does not ask the court to do anything. Complying with the statute does not cost an out of state trustee a jurisdictional objection.
The Evidence Problem That Beat a Beneficiary
In 2010 the Fourth District decided the case that shows how this goes wrong for the person objecting. A guardian moved to stop a corporate trustee paying its fees from the trust, and won below. The appellate court reversed.
To obtain an order prohibiting Covenant from paying any more attorney's fees from the trust assets, section 736.0802(10)(b) states that the "party must make a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or by proffering evidence that provides a reasonable basis for a court to conclude that there has been a breach of trust." No evidence was provided or proffered showing a breach of trust.
Covenant Trust Co. v. Guardianship of Ihrman, 45 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).
What makes it striking is that the trustee had apparently not complied either.
The trust provisions do not prohibit the payment of attorney's fees, and section 736.0802(10) states that attorney's fees may be made by the trustee without any approval, although subsection (10)(a) requires the trust company send notice when the proceedings involve a breach of trust, which Covenant apparently did not do.
Covenant Trust Co. v. Guardianship of Ihrman, 45 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).
The order still fell, because the trial court had not made the finding the statute requires.
Section 736.0802(10)(b) states that "[i]f the court finds that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that there has been a breach of trust, unless the court finds good cause, the court shall enter an order prohibiting the payment of further attorney's fees and costs from the assets of the trust and shall order attorney's fees or costs previously paid from assets of the trust to be refunded." Accordingly, the trial court erred in entering this order without making any such finding of breach of trust.
Covenant Trust Co. v. Guardianship of Ihrman, 45 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).
Two lessons sit in that. Both a prohibition on further payments and a refund of fees already paid are on the table. And a beneficiary who objects without putting evidence in front of the judge can win in the trial court and lose on appeal.
Why the Year of the Case Matters Here More Than Anywhere
This section has been amended ten times since the Trust Code took effect on July 1, 2007, most recently in 2022. Subsection (10), the fee procedure above, was substantially amended effective July 1, 2016.
So the year of the statute a court was reading is not a footnote on this page, it is load bearing. The 2010 decision quoted above applies the 2009 text. The 2015 decision applies the 2011 text. Both predate the 2016 amendment. A 2017 Third District decision refers to the notice requirement under the 2017 version, which is the post amendment text, and it is the only one of the decisions we read that does.
None of that makes the older cases useless. It does mean that if someone quotes you a rule from a trust fee case, the first question is which year of the statute the court had in front of it, and the second is whether that part of the section has moved since.
Florida courts do this themselves. In a November 2025 decision the Fourth District cited section 736.1001(1) as the 2022 statute and section 736.0802(2) as the 2012 statute in the same opinion, because the self-dealing transaction it was reviewing had happened in 2012 while the accounting question belonged nearer the litigation. When a court is that careful about which year it is reading, it is a sign the practice matters.
What Happens When the Claim Goes Away
The fee procedure has an ending, and Florida's newest appellate court supplied it in December 2025. The Sixth District, applying the 2023 text, described what happens once a breach of trust claim is disposed of without a finding against the trustee.
Under the Florida Trust Code, ch. 736, Fla. Stat., when a pleading asserting a breach of trust claim is "withdrawn, dismissed, or judicially resolved in the trial court without a determination that the trustee has committed a breach of trust," the trustee who successfully defended the breach of trust claim "is authorized to use trust assets to pay attorney fees and costs" incurred in the defense without notice to beneficiaries or order of the court. § 736.0802(10)(g), Fla. Stat. (2023).
Johnson v. Wolter, No. 6D2024-0812 (Fla. 6th DCA Dec. 5, 2025).
So the restrictions in subsection (10) are tied to a live allegation. If the claim is withdrawn, dismissed or resolved without a determination of breach, the trustee may pay from the trust without notice and without a court order. In that case the trial court had barred a trustee from doing so, and the appellate court reversed with instructions to deny the motion.
For a beneficiary that is worth understanding before filing. A breach claim that does not succeed does not simply fail; it can leave the trustee entitled to have the trust pay for the defence.
The Core Duty in a Florida Court, Recently
The clearest applications of subsection (1) by Florida courts are both from 2025.
In June the Fourth District quoted the duty and used it to decide who could sell property.
"[A] trustee shall administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries." § 736.0802(1), Fla. Stat. (2023).
"[A] sale . . . involving the investment or management of trust property . . . which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests is voidable by a beneficiary affected by the transaction unless" "[t]he transaction was approved by the court" or "[t]he beneficiary consented to the trustee's conduct." § 736.0802(2)(b), (d), Fla. Stat. (2023).
Varano v. Varano, No. 4D2024-1571 (Fla. 4th DCA June 11, 2025).
A widow with a life estate could not bind the remainder trust to a sale, because her personal economic interest conflicted with her duty to the trust's sole beneficiary. That is the duty and the voidability rule working together on ordinary facts.
In November the same court applied subsection (2) to a self-dealing property titling from 2012, and held the transaction voidable, with the limitations period not running until the beneficiary had actual knowledge.
What We Found and What We Did Not
On August 13, 2026 we searched Florida state and federal decisions for this section number, restricted to Florida courts, and found fourteen. We have read all fourteen.
Of the nine read, several cite the section without engaging it, and we have not built on those. In one 2014 decision it appears in a string citation about reasonable fees in a case really about service of process. In a 2011 decision the only mention sits inside the appellate court's quotation of the trial court's order, not in its own reasoning. And in another 2014 decision the section is cited for a proposition about representing and binding contingent beneficiaries, which is not what this section addresses at all.
That last one is worth naming plainly. Citations in opinions are occasionally simply wrong, and a page built by counting search hits rather than reading them would repeat the error.
We have not run a citator pass, and a section-number search does not find decisions that discuss a provision without naming it.